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abstract: As of May 27, 2015, estimates of Oman’s total population stood at 4,187,516 persons, of 
whom 1,849,412 (44.2 per cent) were foreign nationals. Foreign workers are overwhelmingly from the 
Asian subcontinent: Indians, Bangladeshis and Pakistanis together made up 87 per cent of the workforce 
in 2013. Eighty-two per cent of all foreign workers were employed in the private sector that year, and 12 
per cent were filling managerial and “white collar” posts. The flow of foreign workers to Oman has been 
rising over the 2000s up till today. Lagging youth employment and rising poverty levels spurred popular 
protests in 2011 which slowed down economic diversification and the private sector’s development pro-
cess. However, sectoral Omanisation quotas are now enforced and the hiring of Omani nationals in every 
business has become mandatory. Aggressive measures also target foreign residents in irregular situation 
which has led to several massive amnesty and deportation campaigns since 2010.
Keywords:  Oman, Foreign & National Populations, Foreign Population, Labour Market, National & 
Foreign Labour, Statistics, Omanisation, Irregular Migration, Amnesty, Deportation.
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Françoise De Bel-Air
M igration is at the heart of Oman’s history and socio-demographic framework. Trade relations (including slave trade) with the coastal regions of East Africa were established in the Mid-dle Ages. Indian merchants from the Gujarat region in the north-west of India settled in 
Omani ports during the fifteenth century. Oman’s colonial empire later developed transnational ties with 
the Indian subcontinent (Baluchistan), East Africa (Zanzibar), Persia and the rest of the Gulf region, 
as populations travelled between Oman and these territories in search of livelihoods. Many Baluchis, 
for instance, were enrolled into the country’s armed forces, while wealthy Omani merchants and poor 
workers alike settled in Tanzania and elsewhere in East Africa. After Pakistan and Tanzania gained 
independence, in 1947 and 1964 respectively, descendants of Omani settlers, as well as populations 
originating from these areas “returned” to Oman and were incorporated into the country’s multicultural, 
multi-religious, and multi-ethnic society.1 Labour-oriented migration also enhanced the mobility of 
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population from and to Oman: since oil was first exploited in the Gulf region in the 1930s, poverty had 
pushed a majority of low-skilled, low-educated Omani workers to seek employment in the neighbour-
ing Gulf countries.2 Exploitable oil fields in Oman were indeed discovered only in 1964, and Petroleum 
Development (Oman) Ltd. (PDO) began production in August 1967.3  
However, following Sultan Qaboos bin Said Al Said’s accession to the throne in 1970, Omani ex-
patriates were encouraged to return and emigration flows reversed.4 Furthermore, after the oil boom of 
1973, the Sultanate became an importer of foreign labour. Owing to Oman’s historical ties with South 
Asia,5  Asian workers made up the bulk of foreign workers from the start.6 During the 1990s, after the 
First Gulf War when oil prices fell and an economic slowdown resulted, the number of foreign residents 
seemed to stagnate (0.4 per cent annual growth on average between 1993 and 2003).7 However, it dou-
bled between 2003 and 2009: Oman’s economic performance started improving significantly in 1999 
due to the upturn in oil prices.8 Foreign nationals made up 26.5 per cent of the total population in 1993, 
23.9 per cent in 2003, and 36 per cent in 2009 when the global financial crisis occurred.
Since 1970, Oman has embarked on an ambitious programme of economic liberalisation and mod-
ernisation sustained by high oil prices. The Sultanate evolved from a country lacking in basic services and 
infrastructure to a modern state. The Human Development Report of 2010 entitled “The Real Wealth 
of Nations” attested to this rate of progress by ranking Oman as the fastest HDI (Human Development 
Index) mover globally over the past forty years: the index more than doubled between 1970 and 2010, 
from 0.36 to 0.79. Interestingly, this rapid rate of development was achieved without a comprehensive 
publicly documented knowledge of the Sultanate’s demography, as the first census ever conducted in 
Oman only took place in 1993.9 Before the 1990s, partial demographic and socioeconomic data were 
collected in the framework of the Five-Year Development Plans and included estimates of the labour 
force by nationality.10 However, most data concerned only the Omani population. 
The oil rent has been instrumental in financing the state-building enterprise in Oman since 1970.11 
However, the country is less hydrocarbon-rich than other GCC states, and Omani policy-makers are in-
creasingly focussed on diversifying the country’s economy. This is one of the main targets of Oman 2020, 
the long-term strategic development master plan launched in 1996. Following drastic economic reforms, 
Oman became a member of the World Trade Organization in October 2000. In its eighth five-year plan 
(2011-15), the government has increased spending on key infrastructure projects, which is enhancing 
Oman’s status as a logistics hub in the region. Expansion and development of the three major ports at 
Salalah, Duqm, and Sohar are ongoing, and major upgrades to the international airports in Muscat and 
Salalah are also underway. 12 In 2011, oil and gas accounted for 38.8 per cent of Oman’s GDP.
Another of the main concerns of Omani policymakers, expressed in the Oman 2020 Plan, is the 
alleviation of the national economy’s dependency on foreign labourers and the “Omanisation” of the 
workforce. Instrumental in this matter was “the repositioning the private sector as the engine of eco-
nomic growth and generating employment.”13 The challenge is indeed crucial. As a result of past very 
high levels of fertility and high demographic growth rates since mortality decreased in the 1970s, Oman 
is a “young” society: until 1990, at least 45 per cent of the population was below 15 years of age. Even if 
census 2010 showed a sharp decrease in fertility14 and in the share of the young age groups in the total 
population (27.2 per cent below 15 years of age),15 the numerous generations born in the 1970s and 
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1980s are now on the job market. Moreover, as education levels have improved spectacularly since the 
1970s, every year almost 30,000 students successfully complete their secondary schooling and are ready 
to enter the job market. Yet, most find it difficult to get a job: “the reason for this is the lack of vocational/
higher education and/or the lack of practical work experience compared to expatriate labourers working 
in similar positions.”16 Indeed, implementation of the economic diversification and rationalisation plan 
created a gap between private sector labour needs and expectations of young Omanis, who, like young 
people elsewhere in the region, would stay unemployed if no opportunities were offered in the govern-
ment sector. From its onset in the mid-1990s, Oman Vision 2020 had outlined specific quantitative tar-
gets for the indigenisation of the workforce. These included expanding the proportion of Omanis in the 
labour force from 17 per cent of the total population in 1995 to 50 per cent in 2020; doubling the rate of 
female participation in the labour force from about 6 per cent in 1995 to 12 per cent by 2020; and lifting 
the Omanisation ratio from 68 per cent in 1995 to 95 per cent in 2020 for the public sector and from 
15 per cent in 1995 to 70 per cent in 2020 for the private sector. Some advancements can be witnessed, 
especially concerning the female workforce, for instance in retail trade. Certain economic sectors were 
also successfully localised (taxi driving, for instance). However, Omanisation measures were never fully 
enforced and youth unemployment rates remain high. Oman does not publish unemployment statistics 
but rates among nationals, in general, are said to reach approximately 15 per cent and above 30 per cent 
in the youth segment.17 
In such a context, the political uprisings which shook the Arab world starting at the end of 2010 
did not spare the Sultanate. Oman witnessed popular demonstrations protesting the corruption among 
ruling elites, inequality in the redistribution of resources, difficulties in accessing employment opportuni-
ties, and stagnating salaries. Migrant workers were also explicitly targeted by these protests: some slogans 
accused the regime of keeping employment opportunities for its allies, the inhabitants of the Sultanate’s 
capital Muscat, as well as foreign labourers. Xenophobic statements even alleged “Indian colonisation” of 
Oman and criticised the privileges granted to foreign managers by the Omani business class, while call-
ing for a total Omanisation of the country’s top economic roles.18 In response, 50,000 public sector jobs 
were immediately created for Omanis, and the minimum wage was raised to 200 Omani Rials (around 
$500) in the private sector.19 
Since then, much voluntarism has been shown in the implementation of the Omanisation process. 
The newest labour law announced by the Shura Council in July 2013 put a cap on foreign workers at 33 
per cent of the population. Other laws designed to promote local employment are being discussed, such 
as a new taxation on foreign worker remittances, according to the Economic and Financial Commit-
tee of the Shura Council.20 The Ministry of Manpower has announced that from March 2014, it will 
not entertain any transactions regarding any facility in the private sector that does not have a national 
workforce.21 
Additionally, foreign workers and residents in irregular situation are increasingly criminalised. A 
massive deportation campaign22 was conducted late 2010, after several months of amnesty. Seventy 
thousand undocumented labourers, mainly from the Indian subcontinent, left the country or were de-
ported following massive rounding up operations. In 2013, increased raids and inspections led to the 
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apprehension of over 13,000 undocumented workers and the cancellation of over 16,000 visas.23 Crack-
downs on undocumented migrant workers and deportation continued throughout 2014. As of early 
2015, it was expected that some 47,000 irregular workers, mostly from Bangladesh, would take advan-
tage of an upcoming amnesty and leave Oman.24 
INWarD MIGratIoN
Stocks
Figure 1: omanis and expatriates in total resident population (various sources, 1993-2013)
As of May 27, 2015, estimates of the Sultanate’s total population stood at 4,187,516, of whom 
1,849,412 (44.2 per cent) were foreign nationals.25 The 1993 census, the first population census ever 
conducted in Oman, put the total population at 2,017,643, with foreign residents accounting for 26.5 
per cent. The second Omani census, conducted in December 2003, estimated the total population at 
2,340,815, of which 23.9 per cent were foreign residents. In December 2010, the last census conducted 
to date counted a total of 2,773,479 residents, of whom 816,143 (29.4 per cent) were foreign nationals.26 
The evolution of population figures since 1993 as displayed in Fig. 1 shows that in Oman, like in all other 
GCC states, the numbers of foreign nationals rose rapidly during the 2000s. This was in conjunction 
with the hike in oil prices and ensuing economic upsurge witnessed in the region during the decade, 
which stimulated infrastructural development and, hence, manpower needs. The continuous increase in 
the numbers of foreign nationals, however, stands in contrast with the drop in figures of foreign nation-
als, observed in all other GCC states after the 2008 financial crisis. Moreover, the low figures of foreign 
nationals recorded during the 2010 census suggest some inconsistencies in the population data. 
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As stated earlier, the late onset of a comprehensive and ambitious infrastructural development 
process (1970) explains why the Sultanate has only a recent history of recording population movements. 
Yet, the Sultanate has caught up and set up a modern statistical apparatus from scratch: within the 1990 
to 2010 time-span, Oman evolved from “an absence, to a hyper sophistication” of population statistics.27 
However, Fig. 1 shows that the population estimates drawn for intercensal periods (1994-2002 and 
2003-2009)28 built respectively on the basis of 1993 and 2003 census results do not match the censuses’ 
results for 2003 and 2010. In particular, the gap is huge between the numbers of expatriates actually 
recorded during the 2010 census (816,143), and the number expected on the basis of the intercensal 
yearly estimates (in the range of 1,162,000).29 Three scenarios may explain such shifts in numbers: 1) 
the 2003 and 2010 censuses underestimated population numbers; 2) intercensal estimates inflated the 
figures of Omanis, and mostly, of foreign residents; 3) a sizeable number of the latter left Oman the years 
the censuses took place. 
1) The use of the latest technological innovations at every step of the three census operations, 
from interviewers’ training to data collection, loading, and processing30 has been widely ac-
knowledged.31 In 2003, in particular, Oman became the first country in the world to equip 
interviewers with Personal Digital Assistants (PDA) devices.32 Census-takers were numerous 
and well-trained, a thorough information campaign in the media ensured the cooperation of the 
population, public institutions were mobilised (schools, the Army, for instance) and the Sultan 
himself was directly involved. Detailed results of the 2003 census were released within less than 
a month, a sign of confidence in the reliability of the data. In 2010, by contrast, even though 
technological innovations were more advanced than in 2003,33 a number of organisational and 
informational drawbacks were reported in the press and among other ministries’ officials to have 
affected the validity of the census results.34 Indeed, the sharp drop in the figures of foreign resi-
dents in the 2010 census results raises questions.35 It effectively contrasts with the other sources 
available for the post-2003 period: the intercensal estimates as well as the newly-established 
civil registration system.
2) Intercensal estimates (1994-2002 and 2004-2009) are drawn using the components method.36 
However, before 2004 and the creation of the Directorate General of Civil Status (a public body 
in charge of civil registration),37 the systematic and comprehensive registration of births and 
deaths, and, hence, knowledge of the age structure of the total population was far from com-
plete.38 Therefore, it is likely that intercensal estimates of Omani and non-Omani populations 
between 1994 and 2002 are not fully accurate. As regards the period 2004-2009, intercensal 
estimates of the foreign residents’ population are based on the 2003 census results, which were 
considered to be of high quality. Moreover, these estimates are close to the figures provided by 
the Civil Registration System (dotted lines on Fig. 1). Therefore, it is likely that the Civil Reg-
istration System provides more accurate estimates of the numbers of Omanis, and of non-Om-
anis, than Census 2010. The figure of expatriates in 2010 is thus probably closer to 1,160,000 as 
estimated from the Civil Registration records than to the published figure of 816,173. 
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3) Nevertheless, the steep drop in the number of foreign nationals recorded during the 2010 census 
held in the month of December may also be due to the aggressive police operations conducted 
during the year. As mentioned earlier, 70,000 irregulars were deported that year. Moreover, 
many other undocumented foreign nationals may have been hiding from census operations for 
fear of being deported too. The police crackdown against illegal sojourners in the year of census 
may thus explain part of the underestimation of foreign residents in 2010. 
Census 2010 is, however, the only detailed source of information available on the expatriate popu-
lation as a whole. Data suggest that the non-Omanis are overwhelmingly Asians (88 per cent of the 
total): Indian nationals alone made up 57 per cent of all resident expatriates that year. Arabs (GCC and 
non-GCC nationals) are no more than 8.5 of all expatriates. In general, Arab populations display a more 
balanced sex ratio (128 men for 100 women) than Asians: among Bangladeshis, for instance, there are 
ten men for every woman resident.  
table 1: oman’s foreign resident population by main region of origin/country of  
citizenship and sex ratio (2010)
A more balanced sex ratio in the total population indicates that Arabs are more likely to reside with 
their families in the Sultanate than Asians are. As a matter of fact, children aged 0-14 make up about 
one-third of total GCC and non-GCC Arab populations. Among Asians as a whole, they make up only 
8 per cent (5 per cent among Bangladeshis and less than 1 per cent among Indonesians, of whom most 
are women). Until 2013, a foreign labourer was able to sponsor his dependents on a family reunification 
visa on the condition that his monthly income would be 300 Omani Rials and above.39 In other GCC 
countries where the distribution of professions and income levels by regional origin is available, it ap-
pears that most Arabs are employed in the upper and middle echelons of the occupational scale, below 
Westerners. This guarantees them the possibility of bringing their families over and of settling for longer 
periods in their GCC host countries. Moreover, in Oman, like anywhere else in the Gulf, salary levels 
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Total foreign residents
Number %
GCC countries 7,997 1.0 103
U.A.E.
 
6,426 0.8 91
Non-GCC Arab countries 60,989 7.5 128
Egypt 29,877 3.7 136
Jordan 7,403 0.9 124
Asian countries 721,511 88.4 376
India 465,660 57.1 459
Bangladesh 107,125 13.1 999
Pakistan 84,658 10.4 634
Rest of the world 25,646 3.1 114
Total 816,143 100.0 320
sex ratio (men/
100 women) 
Source: Census 2010, Ministry of National Economy.
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differ in each profession, according to the nationality group of the employee. Westerners earn on average 
the highest salaries, followed by Arabs and then Asians. This “racialised” labour market indeed entails 
discrimination and inequalities beyond the divide nationals/non-nationals.40    
Figure 2: oman total population by region of origin and 
broad age group distribution (2010)
Even though some variations exist by regional and national origin of expatriates, the bulk of for-
eign residents in Oman are indeed workers.41 In 2013, 1,498,277 (89 per cent) of all foreign residents 
were employed and 184,927 (11 per cent) were family dependents.42 As a whole, expatriate labourers 
in Oman are predominantly males (89 per cent or 780 men for 100 women), relatively young (mean 
age is 33 years), and little educated (74 per cent of them, men and women alike, have below-secondary 
level education as of mid-2014),43 which reflects the characteristics of the numerically-dominant group 
within the expatriate population. Indeed, the overwhelming majority of workers come from the Asian 
subcontinent: Indians, Bangladeshis, and Pakistanis together make up 87 per cent of the workforce. 
Ethiopians (quasi-exclusively females) make up 3 per cent and Egyptians only 1 per cent of the em-
ployed population.44 
Regarding expatriates’ economic characteristics, as of mid-2013 most of them (85 per cent) were 
sponsored by public or private institutions or companies. Only a minority were actually sponsored by 
individual kafeel (14.7 per cent), half of these being domestic workers. 
Eighty-two per cent of all foreign workers were employed in the private sector that year, 90 per cent 
of them among men and 17 per cent among women. The latter were most often in the domestic sector 
(72 per cent). In 2010, the domestic workers’ socio-demographic profile was as follows: 35 per cent were 
from Indonesia, 29 per cent from India, and 12 per cent from the Philippines; more than a half were 
in the age group 30-44 (55 per cent). Ninety percent had below secondary education and most (70 per 
cent) were married.45 In 2013, 81 per cent of employed foreign females46 were in domestic activities; 
5 per cent were in the education sector and 2.5 were in the retail and trade sector. As for the males, 49 
per cent were in the construction sector while 13 per cent were, respectively, in the retail and trade and 
manufacturing sectors.47  
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 Figure 3: Employed non-omanis by occupation and sex 
(private and domestic sectors, 2013)
As regards expatriates’ occupational level, Fig. 3 shows that in 2013, 65 per cent of males were in 
blue-collar occupations, industry or handicraft professions, while the overwhelming majority of females 
were in occupations related to services. Around 12 per cent of expatriates only were involved in white-
collar occupations, men and women alike. Interestingly, no expatriates were employed as clerical workers. 
This suggests the impact of Omanisation policies, which reserve white-collar professions, especially the 
ones not demanding high levels of skills and educational specialisations, to local job seekers. 
Indeed, Fig. 448 shows the regular increase of the absolute numbers of Omanis employed in the 
country’s private sector. The progression started stagnating, however, after 2010. This is probably due to 
the economic slowdown of the late 2000s followed by the unrest that erupted in the country in 2011. 
The government response to the claims, i.e., supplying public employment opportunities, is visible on 
the chart, yet the figure for 2013 suggests that the nationals’ enrolment in the private sector could be on 
the rise again. However, a comparison with the figures of expatriates’ employment in the private sector 
clearly indicates that the numbers of foreign workers have increased more rapidly than that of locals 
(Fig. 4). Expatriates made up 89.4 per cent of the private sector’s total workforce in 2013.49 
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 Figure 4: omanis and expatriates by sector of employment
(public, private) (2005-2012) 
Flows
Statistics of permits delivered indeed suggest that the flow of foreign residents to Oman has not been 
affected much over the years: 541,572 permits were delivered in 2007 and 919,314 in 2012, an 11 per 
cent increase per year on average.50 Additionally, in spite of the Omanisation process, the flow of for-
eign workers to Oman (for regular and domestic employment, in blue and grey on the chart) shows an 
upward trend (Fig. 5). However, the number of family residence permits has been significantly reduced 
since 2008. In 2009, only 16,696 family reunion permits were granted, as opposed to 113,005 the year 
before. The share of family dependents within the flows of foreign residents to Oman was divided by 
half approximately since 2008, from 17-18 per cent of all permits delivered to 8-10 per cent in the early 
2010s. This raises the question of a possible decrease in the skill level of workers who have come to Oman 
from the year 2009 onwards: the possibility of family reunion is indeed limited to relatively high-income 
categories of foreign residents, those earning at least 300 Omani Rials.
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 Figure 5:  Flows of foreign residents to oman by type of permit granted (2007-2013)
In fact, family reunion seems to have become a direct target of public policy in the tense aftermath 
of the financial crisis of 2008 and the 2011 civil unrests. New measures regarding family reunion were 
announced by the Directorate-General of Passport and Residences at the Royal Oman Police (ROP) 
in 2013. These imposed a doubling of the monthly minimum income allowing expatriates to be granted 
a family reunion permit, now set at 600 Omani Rials ($1,558).51 Officials state that such attempts at 
limiting family reunion respond to the need to better manage the labour market and create more job 
opportunities for Omanis. Family dependents under family residence visas will be barred from taking up 
employment. Other families allegedly left the country because of their failure to secure family reunion.52
Figure 6: Flows of foreign workers to oman (2007-2013)
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However, similar constraints have been applied to workers too and a major overhaul of the labour 
market seems to be taking place in Oman. The number of labour visas almost doubled between 2007 
and 2012 (it decreased in 2013): this probably indicates the difficulty of “Omanising” the labour force in 
every sector, especially in sectors of activity such as construction, which directly concern Oman’s infra-
structural development plans. As seen in Fig. 6, visas granted since 2008 were mostly renewals granted 
to workers already in the country, which suggests a strategy of rationalising the workforce by retaining 
the workers already trained. Cancellation of permits has more than doubled since 2007. More recently, 
measures aiming at curbing the import of new foreign workers and at fighting irregularity were taken. 
Since 2010, several bans on recruitment of new workers in certain sectors have been imposed: for ex-
ample, a six-month ban was placed on expatriate recruitment in the cleaning and construction sectors 
for small companies, which officials claim facilitate visa fraud. Another freeze in recruitment of foreign 
labourers was announced in October 2013.53 Such measures may also explain the drop in the issuance 
of new visas noticed in the Fig 6.
Foreign labourers’ mobility on the labour market was also limited by some recent decisions an-
nounced by the government. Although since 2006, “expatriates no longer need the permission of their 
current employer to switch to a new one,”54 the Royal Oman Police announced a two-year re-entry ban 
on foreigners willing to return to the Sultanate after failing to complete two years with his/her previous 
sponsor in Oman. Employment visa transfers for foreign workers who have not completed two years of 
their work contract with their company also became forbidden.55 From a peak of 42,228 sponsorship 
changes completed in 2010, the figure reached a low of 551 in 2013. Limiting workers’ mobility was said 
to aim at “preventing foreign workers from job-hopping prior to the completion of their contracts and 
to prevent employers from poaching employees from competitors.”56  
More likely, the enforcement of sectoral Omanisation quotas57 and the mandatory hiring of Omani 
nationals in all private sector businesses58 are comparable to Saudi Arabia’s “Nitaqat” programme of na-
tionalisation of the workforce. Similarly, the deportation campaigns and police operations conducted in 
the Sultanate since 2010 echoed the crackdowns on irregular workers performed in the Kingdom since 
2013. In Oman, like in Saudi Arabia, business owners as well as expatriates whose jobs are at stake are 
thus left with the responsibility of alleviating youth unemployment and discontent. 
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